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Abstract: Privacy protection is the primary concern when RFID applications are deployed in our daily
lives. Due to passive tags that are computationally weak, the non-encryption-based simulation protocols
have been recently developed, in which wireless jamming is used. However, the existing private tag access
protocols without sharing secrets depends on impractical assumptions hence difficult to deploy. To tackle
this issue we redesign RFID architecture by dividing RFID reader into an RF activator and Trusted
Shield Device (TSD). Then we proposed new coding scheme namely Random Flipping Random Jamming
(RFRJ), to protect the tags contents. Analysis and simulation results validate our distributed architecture
with the RFRJ coding scheme, which protects tag’s privacy against various adversaries like encoding
collision, random guessing attack, correlation attack, eavesdropping, and ghost and leech attack.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The RFID technology is an electronic tagging
technology that allows object to be automatically
identified at a distance without a direct line of sight
using electromagnetic waves for exchange of data.
RFID enables a tremendous amount of
applications, such as electric transportation
payments, warehouse operations, supply chain
management, animal identification, attendance
system and more. Objects and their owners are
automatically identified by an attached RF tag,
which causes the privacy threat to individuals and
organizations. Thus privacy protection is our main
concern when RFID applications are deployed in
our daily lives. Since passive tags are
computationally weak devices, encryption based
secured simulation are not possible. Hence instead
relying traditional cryptographic operations, we
employ physical layer technique called jamming to
protects tag’s data. The issues with the existing
solutions, the privacy masking, randomized bit
encoding (RBE), dynamic bit encoding (DBE) and
optimized DBE (ODBE) takes the Impractical
assumptions. In these solutions, all the bits
transmitted by tag are masked or jammed where the
receiver can read a bit only when 2 bits (the data bit
and mask bit) are same. When 2 bits are different,
it is assumed that the receiver is unable to recover
the corrupted bit. However this assumption is too
strong since a reader should be able to detect
signals from two different sources. In reality, a
receiver of a data bit will decode it as either 0 or 1
without knowing the bit collision. If there is a bit
collision, either a signal strength of data bits from
tag is stronger than that of jamming bits or vice
versa. In other words, depending upon the location
of the reader, it can read all the data bits or all the
jamming bits. Also masking requires the perfect
synchronization between the data bits and mask bit
which is difficult to achieve in practice. In addition
to this, DBE and ODBE have drawbacks that are
1) Two different source bits are encoded as same
bit which fails simulation called encoding collision.
2) Tag’s data encoded by this technique could
eventually be cracked and repeatedly listen to
backward channel (i.e. signal from tag to reader).
So none of the above mentioned solutions protects
the tag’s data from various adversaries. To tackle
this issue we put a new RFID architecture and a
new coding scheme for protection against various
adversary model.
II. LITERATURE SURVEY
Literature survey review is a vital to have an in-
depth knowledge of ones intended research area
and to learn more about subject matter. In this
section we review the previous methods used for
securing the data of the tags and what are their
demerits which promote us to do this paper. A
paper published in [1] by K. Sakai, W. S. Ku, R.
Zimmermann and M. T. Sun had discuss about that
the Choi and Roh Proposed a privacy masking
where the data must be send with the masking ID,
but here the receiver should know about the
masking knowledge. Lim provides Randomized Bit
Encoding (RBE) which provides the protection
against guessing attacks for BC But both
techniques can’t provide protection against the
unauthorized access. This paper introduces DBE
where it encodes i th source bit based on all
preceding (I - 1)th source bit and ODBE where it
was design to improve security level from DBE by
dynamically changing the maximum codeword
length for each source bit. But both techniques
have two drawbacks as encoding collision because
of source bit and data bit are encoded as a single bit
causes simulation to fail and another one is
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correlation attack where tag’s data eventually be
cracked so repeatedly listen to the backward
channel. In [3] and [6] we studied about practical
and real time wireless system because RFID is a
real time wireless system and alsi about capabilities
of low power wireless jammers because we
distributed the RFID reader into RF activator and
TSD where TSD is capable of bit level jamming. In
[7] authors introducing RBE scheme that strength
the privacy protection which is used together with
backward channel protection method proposed by
Choi and Roh. But this method faces the same-bit
problem which then tackle by introducing trusted
masking device (TMD) in place of RF reader for
transmission of masking signals which makes
increase in the cost of system. Weis provides
solution by introducing randomized tree walking
algorithm which then strengthens by Choi and Roh.
But in this technique if application requires more
than 60 tags then it troubles singulation overhead.
Also it doesn’t include termination condition and
omits final phase that reads real tag ID. Again in
[8] Bolotnyy and Robins introducing Randomized
Pseudo random function tree walking algorithm
which is mathematically complex.
III. PROPOSED ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we proposed a new RFID system
architecture for secure simulations as shown in
fig.3.
3.1 Assumptions: We begin with listing physical
layer assumptions as follow. 1. Bit level jamming
is feasible. 2. An eavesdropper does not know if bit
is jammed. 3. Probabilistic flipping model is used
for a jamming environment.
3.2 New RFID Architecture An RFID reader is
divided into two components, an RF activator and a
trusted shield device (TSD). In our new
architecture an RF activator queries a tag with long
range signal (i.e., forward channel) and energized
the tag. In this paper, for simplicity we consider the
RF activator as the final destination of a tag’s data
by assuming the activator forwards the collected
data to the back end server. A TSD works as RF
listener and is capable of bit level jamming during
reception of tag’s reply. Hence our architecture
consists of three components: an RF activator, a
TSD, and RF tag. In this paper, we use random
flipping random jamming, for the backward
channel protection. A tag will send pseudo ID to
TSD under jamming environment. This prevents
adversaries from passive attacks, i.e., the random
guessing attack, correlation attack, and
eavesdropping. RFRJ coding provides protection
against adversaries due to jamming while TSD
successfully recovers data. A TSD is conceptually
similar to the trusted masking device in [7] and
medical device shield, but different in following
functions.
1. On overhearing a query from an activator to a
tag, a TSD jams a bit in a codeword. Hence
jamming is possible as mentioned in assumptions.
2. If an unauthorized reader is tries to access a tag,
a TSD jams against all bits of codeword so that the
unauthorized reader can’t read the content of
transmitted data which is done by an authorized
activator communicate with a TSD before a
simulation process.
3. TSD intermediates only the backward channel.
With our new architecture we can achieve the
following goals.
1. The forward channel is protected by having an
activator querying tag based on the pseudo ID pace
encoded by the RFRJ coding logic.
2. The RFRJ coding logic protects the backward
channel against the random guessing attack,
correlation attacks, and eavesdropping.
3. As we assume both an activator and a TSD have
computational power, the relay channel can
protected by the traditional cryptographic
operations.
4. The proposed architecture defends against ghost
and leech attacks. First, an adversary cannot
forward an activator’s query to a tag, since a TSD
blocks all unauthorized accesses. Second, an
adversary cannot obtain a tag’s reply due to the
jamming by TSD. Hence an adversary cannot
impersonate a tag.
3.3 Random Flipping Random Jamming
Coding: In this section, we present the random
flipping random jamming coding logic.
3.3.1 Definition: Let r be an activator, s be a TSD,
and t be an RF tag. An activator which intends to
obtain data from a tag sends a query on the forward
channel. When the tag replies to the TSD, it
encodes every lb bits in the data |into an lc bits
codeword with an encoding function E(.). Note that
lb is not the length of an ID, but the unit to be
encoded into a codeword. A coding scheme for
private tag access is defined by the parameters, lb,
lc , and C. Here, C is a set of codeword that could
be used for encoding. During the transmission of a
pseudo ID on the backward channel, the TSD
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conducts bit level jamming. On receiving the tag’s
reply, the TSD decodes the received codeword by a
decoding function D(.), and forwards the data to
the activator via the relay channel. In general, we
call lb-to-lc the RFRJ coding scheme. For instance,
the coding scheme with lb = 1 and lc = 4 is said to
be the 1 – to – 4 RFRJ coding scheme. The
notations utilized in this paper are listed in below
table.
In the below fig.4, a source bit is encoded onto a 4-
bit codeword. The tag flips the third bit in the
codeword and the TSD selects the first bit for
jamming. Assume the original codeword is 1010.
Since the tag flips the third bit, it will send 1000
over the backward channel. The TSD jams the first
bit. Hence, the TSD and eavesdropper will receive
X000, where X could be decoded to either 0 or 1.
The TSD knows Is , and thus it knows one of the
three bits may contain an error after excluding the
jammed bit. However, the eavesdropper does not
know which bit the TSD jammed or which bit the
tag flipped, for the eavesdropper, two out of the 4
bits may contain errors. Thus, the TSD and
eavesdropper have a different amount of
information to decode the original codeword. In
general, for 1b–to–lc , TSD knows that there is a 1
bit error out of (lc – 1) bits while the eavesdropper
knows there is a two-bit error out of lc bits at best.
Both the TSD and the tag keep the indexes of the
bits they jammed/flipped in secret. The TSD has
one of the secrets, but the eavesdropper knows
neither of them. Therefore, with the coding scheme
the receiver can decode a source bit when one of
the (lc – 1) bits is flipped but not when two of the
lc bits are flipped. Our new system architecture
allows for an RF activator to securely collect RF
tag’s content without shared secrets of data.
3.4 The Single Bit RFRJ Coding Scheme: We
proposed the RFRJ coding scheme with parameter
lb=1 and lc=4. Note that lc=3 does not work and
lc=4 is the most efficient in terms of
communication cost. Let b be a source bit and c be
a codeword. The encoding function E(.):{0, 1}{0,
1}4 is defined by E(b)=c0 if b=0 and E(b)=c1 if
b=1. The encoding function E(.) must ensure that
the humming distance between c0 and c1 denoted
by H(c0, c1) is four. There are 16 such (c0, c1)
pairs that can be used for private tag access. We
call them as 4 bit codeword pair.
3.4.1 Definition(Valid 4 bit codeword pair):
When lc=4 a codeword pair (c0, c1) corresponding
to a source bit pair (0, 1) is said to be valid when
the humming distance between c0 and c1 is four
i.e., (0000, 1111), (0001, 1110), (0010, 1101),
(0100, 1011), (1000, 0111), (0011, 1100), (0110,
1001), (0101, 1010) and (c0, c1). Let c’ be the
received codeword in which up to 2 bits could be
flipped. We define the decoding function as D:{0,
1}4{0, 1}. Since a TSD knows the index of the
jammed bit, the decoding function ignores the
jammed bit. A tag also flips a bit which is unknown
to the TSD, and the 3 bits contain the flipped bit
after the TSD removes the jammed bit. Let H(b, b’,
i) be the humming distance between b and b’ after
removing the ith bit from b and b’. D(c’) outputs 0
when H(c’, c0, Is)H(c’, c1, Is). note that H(c’, c0,
Is)=H(c’, c1, Is) never happens.
Result And Analysis
Fig.6 Simulation result with input 0101
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Fig.5. Schematic diagram.
Fig.6. Output results.
IV. CONCLUSION
A number of existing methodologies for the
detection of the attacks and their solution have
been studied and algorithm was proposed for the
same in the RFID system. In this paper, we first
proposed a novel distributed RFID architecture
which divides the RF reader into two parts: an RF
activator and a TSD, each tailoring for a specific
function of an RF reader. In addition, we proposed
the RFRJ coding scheme, which when incorporated
with the new architecture, works against a wide
range of adversaries including random guessing
attack, correlation attack, ghost and leech attack,
and eavesdropping. The physical layer assumptions
of the proposed RFID architecture and the
encoding scheme are readily available. In addition,
the hardware cost of the new architecture is
theoretically cheaper than the existing RFID
systems. We believe the proposed architecture will
serve the foundation of the next generation RFID
systems.
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